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ABSTRACT
Social Interactions in Demand*
We examine theoretically demand in a two-good economy where the demand of one good is
influenced by either a spillover effect in the form of an externality from other consumers’
choices and or a conformity effect representing a need for making similar choices as others.
A positive spillover effect increases the demand for the good with interactions, and a
conformity effect makes the demand curve pivot around the average market demand to make
demand less price sensitive. The collateral implication is that spillover in consumption
increases the associated derived demand for labor and conformity in consumption makes the
associated derived demand for labor less elastic. Finally, we also demonstrate how the
presence of a good with social interactions affects the demand for the good without social
interactions and the associated demand for the labor producing the non-interactions good.
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1. Introduction
Social interactions are of much policy relevance. They can alter the effects of
taxation or transfer programs intended to improve the economic situation of the poor or
unemployed (Grodner and Kniesner 2006). If there are significant interactions then
optimal policy need consider the synergies described by so-called social multiplier
effects. Where workers care about their positions in the income distribution then a
beneficial regulatory policy that does not alter relative incomes receives too low a benefit
in conventional cost-benefit calculations. Thus, ignoring social interactions can mis-state
significantly the social welfare effects of taxes, transfers, or regulatory policy. Our
contribution to an increased understanding of the role of social interactions is to flesh out
succinctly the demand implications of two basic forms of interactions: spillover
(externality from other consumers' behavior) and conformity (penalty for people
behaving different from the norm), where social interactions are directly embedded into
the utility function via social utility. Our results succinctly clarify (1) how a positive
spillover generally increases product demand (and the associated derived demand for
labor), (2) how conformity pivots product demand around the expected market demand to
make consumers less price responsive (and the associated derived demand for labor also
less elastic), and (3) how social interactions in one good indirectly influence other goods’
demands and the associated derived demand for labor.

2. Organizing Model
We begin with the total utility function (Brock and Durlauf 2001)

V ( x, y;α , μ x ) = V ( u ( x, y ) , S ( x; μ x , α ) ) (1)

st. px x + p y y = M (2)
where x and y are actions/choices made by an individual with the corresponding
prices px and p y , and u ( x, y ) is the private utility associated with a choice bundle

( x, y ) . Here

μ x is the conditional probability measure of choices that a person places on

the choices of others in the reference group, S ( x; μ x , α ) is social utility from the choice
2

of the individual and his or her expectation of the choices of others, α is the parameter
indicating the importance of social utility in total utility, and M is total resources. 1
Finally, we also assume a positive sign for Vu > 0 , and that VS has an uncertain sign
depending on the form of interactions.
We consider two forms of social interactions: positive spillover and conformity.
Positive spillover implies VS > 0 (from social capital, neighborhood/peer, contagion, or
conspicuous consumption effects). Conformity is associated with a negative contribution
to utility because there is a disutility for being different, VS < 0 (from class identity,
social norm, relative income, or reference utility effects). Negative spillover can happen
too via VS < 0 , or non-conformity by taking VS > 0 .
Because spillover is an externality relative to reference group behavior, forms like

S s1 ( x; μ x , α ) = αμ x x , S s 2 ( x; μ x , α ) = αμ x x 2 , and S s 3 ( x; μ x , α ) = αμ x x are examples of
a spillover effect, where S xx affects the slope of demand differently. The first spillover
example above describes social capital or neighborhood effects. The second describes
mathematically peer effects or contagion/herding. The third equation above represents
conspicuous consumption or rat race spillover effects.
Conformity is a fundamental building block in social psychology. The idea is that
individuals tend to conform to broadly defined social norms, with a magnitude depending
on the cohesiveness, group size, and social support. One can model conformity as

S c ( x; μ x , α ) = 1/ x − μ x where someone is rewarded for behaving according to the norm.
The form of social utility in S c is difficult to work with analytically, and we need at least
a restriction that x ≠ μ x . Without loss of generality, we consider conformity a quadratic
loss of utility such as − S c1 ( x; μ x , α ) = − α2 ( x − μ x ) , − S c 2 ( x; μ x , α ) = − 12α ( x − μ x ) , or
2

4

− S c 3 ( x; μ x , α ) = − α4 ( x 2 − μ x2 ) . The first representation of conformity captures social
2

norm effects. The second is how reference income or utility effects look algebraically.
The third type of conformity example above reflects threshold effects or demand
maxima. Again, depending on the form of conformity via Sxx the effect of interactions on
the demands for x and y may differ non-trivially.
3

3. Demand for the Good with Interactions, x
Interactions here are via the expectation of the demand for good x by a particular
consumer, μ x . In an ideal setting or small community an agent may observe others’
demands for x and make sensible inferences concerning expected demand via the sample
mean, median, or mode. In cases where the market is large the individual finds it harder
to infer others' behavior and may resort to using existing norms.
To clarify the effect of interactions now we consider an exogenous change in μ x and
take the total differential of S ( x; μ x , α ) , which is

dS = S xx dx + S xμx d μ x + S xα dα (3)
The difference between the non-interactions case and any case with interdependence is
through S xx , S xμ x , and S xα .
The effects of variables influencing demand here are

P
−λ p y2

substitution effect part

change in price :



− x ( p yVu u xy + pxVu u yy )
income effect part

dx
=
(4a )
dpx 2 px p yVu u xy − px2Vu u yy − p y2Vu u xx + ( − p y2VS S xx )

2
dx p yVS S xα
=
change in magnitude of interactions :
(4b)
dα
det H
p y2VS S xμ x
dx
=
(4c)
change in average market demand :
det H
d μx

where the matrix H is the Hessian, and the determinant of H is
det H = 2 px p yVu u xy − px2Vu u yy − p y2Vu u xx + ( − p y2VS S xx ) > 0. (5)

If the function u ( •) is concave and V ( • ) is without interactions, the concavity of
u (• ) guarantees det H > 0 . However, with interactions present we still need to determine

the sign of p y2VS S xx to decompose the effect of price on demand for x into income and
substitution effects. Note that both components from the Slutsky equation are affected

(

)

because interactions enter the denominator through − p y2VS S xx ; it is true for all further
cases below.
4

Figure 1.1 shows how exogenous positive spillover affects the demand for good x .
All forms of spillover cause demand to increase because S xα , S xμx > 0 . As a consequence,
the associated derived demand for labor also increases. However, the functional form for
social interactions has a profound effect on how exactly demand shifts. For S s1 (social
capital) the shift is parallel, for S s 2 (contagion) the effect is larger for higher levels of x ,
and for S s 3 (conspicuous consumption) the effect is smaller for higher levels of x . Not
only the level of shift differs but also the slope changes non-trivially. Because S xxs1 = 0,

S xxs 2 > 0, S xxs 3 < 0 the first demand curve has the same slope as the no interactions case, the
second demand curve is the same shape but has steeper slope, and the third demand curve
has a different shape than the no-interactions case. The effect of an increase in average
demand, μ x , is qualitatively the same as a change importance of social interactions, α .
Although qualitatively all spillover effects have the same impact on demand,
quantitative implications are dramatically different. Each new demand curve has a
different elasticity, and potential policy implications can vary greatly. For example, when
a researcher needs to calculate deadweight loss of fiscal policy such as taxation, the
results differ for various demand curves. For spillover 1 the deadweight loss is the same
as for the no interactions case. For spillover 2, the deadweight loss would be higher, and
for spillover 3 the deadweight loss would lower than the baseline case of no interactions.
The effect of conformity in the utility function is summarized by Figure 1.2. For all
forms of interactions the demand curve pivots around the point where x = μ x because at
that level of x we have S xα = 0 . Although demand pivots around the average demand,

μ x , the slope of the new demand can be (1) uniformly flatter ( S c1 ), (2) become flatter as
x changes ( S c 2 ), or (3) the slope can change from flatter to steeper ( S c 3 ). The effect of
increase in average demand, μh , is also not uniform though all demand curves increase.
The intuition for conformity is that because there is a penalty for being different
from the norm, there is a natural tendency for consumers to behave similarly. Therefore,
the product demand curve is less elastic, and via Marshall’s Fourth Rule so is the
associated derived demand for labor less elastic. However, non-linearity of the
conformity effect creates break-even points where consumers change behavior from
5

being less responsive to the change in price to more sensitive to price changes. Some of
the behavior resembles the Loss Aversion hypothesis.
The analysis not only stresses the need for modeling non-linear social interactions,
but also underlines the fact that modeling interdependence by the theoretical setup in (1)
and (2) is flexible and accommodates many realistic cases.

4. Demand for the Good without Interactions, y
We also analyze how interactions present in good x affect second good that does
not have interactions, y . Comparative statics results are the derivatives:
P
−λ px2

substitution effect part

change in price :

dy
=
dp y



− y pxVu u xy − p yVu u xx + ( − p yVS S xx )
income effect part

(

2 px p yVu u xy − p V u yy − p V u xx + ( − p V S xx )
2
x u

2
y u

2
y S

dy − px p yVS S xα
(6b)
=
det H
dα
− px p yVS S xμ x
dy
change in average market demand :
(6c)
=
d μh
det H

change in magnitude of interactions :

Interactions affect every derivative through the denominator but interdependence
also influences the income effect through ( − p yVS S xx ) . Because the budget constraint
binds, any change in good x due to a change in the price of good y changes income for
good y .
With a positive spillover effect in good x the demand for good y declines for all
forms of spillover. An increase in average demand increases demand for y , even though
the change differs by form of spillover. The slope can only be established for S s1 (social
capital) as it is the same as the baseline case and demand declines uniformly (because

S xxs1 = 0 the slope for x did not change either). The other cases of spillover for which
S xx ≠ 0 have uncertain change in the slope because ( − p y2VS S xx ) in (6a) has both
flattening and steepening effects.
In the case of conformity, it is unclear what happens to the demand for y because

6

) (6a)

S xx affects both the nominator and denominator of (6a). Even if we focus on the simplest
case, S c1 , S xα = x − μ x , and dy / dα = − px p yVS S xα / det H is uncertain a priori.
Conditional on the level of x , for individuals with x > μh the demand for y is higher. 3
For x < μh the demand for y is lower because more x is consumed, dx / dα > 0 . We
still cannot determine how demand for y changes on the entire range of x because there
is no reference point like μ x in demand for the non-interactions good, y .
A graphical illustration can help. Think of an extreme case where demand for x
becomes perfectly inelastic due to conformity, then demand for y becomes M x / p y ,
where M x = M − px μ x and μ x represents a constant demand for x . Depending on
whether x and y are complements or substitutes the change to the demand for y differs.
The effect of interactions in good x on the demand for good y appears in Figure 2.
If without social interactions goods x and y are substitutes , dx / dp y > 0 , extreme
conformity in x makes demand for good y is less elastic. With the presence of the
substitute the demand for y was more elastic because consumers demand more of x to
substitute because of the higher price of y . When the demand for x is fixed consumers
cannot substitute y with x .
Alternatively, when without interdependence goods x and y are complements,

dx / dp y < 0 , and the demand for good y with extreme conformity in x becomes more
elastic relative to the case of no interactions. When there were no social interactions in x ,
both x and y were relatively tightly connected by being complements. When x is fixed
and a certain part of income is spent on good y , the demand for y becomes more
elastic.
Thus, how interactions in good x affect demand for good y and the demand for
labor producing good y depends on the relationship between the two goods. In some
cases we can make an inference, but the analysis becomes more involved, and the results
may be less useful and intuitive. Nevertheless, we show how interactions in only one
good affect the behavior of other goods as long as the goods are in the same consumer
expenditure bundle.
7

5. Conclusion
In general, a positive spillover effect increases product (and labor) demand, and
specific functional forms for social utility make the slope of demand change non-trivially.
Demand can become more elastic over certain ranges of prices but less elastic over
another ranges of prices. The magnitude of interactions is important because in some
cases part of the population (say, low-demand consumers) may be more strongly affected
by the interactions than the rest of consumers. With conformity, product demand pivots
around the expected market demand, and product (and labor) demand becomes less
elastic. A specific functional form can exaggerate or diminish the general changes to
demand.
We also show that interactions in one good indirectly affect the demand for a good
that has no direct interactions. The inter-good effect hinges on whether the two goods are
complements or substitutes. We cannot analytically provide answers concerning how the
non-interactions good (and associated demand for labor) is affected by an interactions
type good without some prior knowledge of the relationship between the two
commodities.
We acknowledge that there are other forms of interactions potentially represented by
the social utility term S ( • ) besides spillover and conformity; the analytical
representations may vary, and interactions may operate through different channels such
as via the budget constraint. However, we believe that spillover and conformity exhaust
most of the real-life interactions problems and the examples demonstrate the flexibility of
our model setup. Our results are useful for policy changes and welfare analysis because
the qualitative effects on demand are relatively clear; the quantitative outcomes may have
profound consequences on the correct measurement of the deadweight loss or behavioral
effects of taxation.

Endnotes
1

The reference group is any set of individuals (including the entire population) to
which the individual refers when making a demand decision.
n
xi
2
Suppose that μ = ∑ i=1 . If ∀i we have Δx = Δ and Δμ = Δ , then
x

i

n
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x

x

x

∂μ x
∂x

≈

Δμ x
Δxi

=

Δx
Δx

=1.

For x > μh we have ∂∂αx < 0 , so the individual consumes less of good x . There are
more resources for good y , so the individual consumes more y because the budget
constraint is binding and prices and incomes are unchanged.
3
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Figure 1.1. Demonstration of the effect of the spillover interactions on the demand for good x
with different functional forms.

Baseline - no
interactions

Spillover 1
– with Sxx=0
Spillover 2 –
with Sxx>0

px

μx
Quantity of good x

Figure 1.2. Demonstration of the effect of the conformity interactions on the demand for good x
with different functional forms.
Conformity 1

Conformity 2

Conformity 3
Price of good x

Price of good x

Spillover 3 –
with Sxx<0

px

Baseline no interactions

(μx/sqrt(3))

μx
Quantity of good x
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Figure 2. Demonstration of the effect of the conformity in good x on the demand for good y when
there is an extreme conformity in good x (consumer consumes fixed amount of good x); graphs
represent relationship between offer curves and demand curves (for good y).

no
interactions substitutes

extreme
conformity no interactions
- complements

y

y

μx
x

py

12

